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NO. 82-52, Ariaona Governing Committee v. Norris 
Revised version of footnote 6 (page 5): 
When this Court held for the first time that the federal 
govern.ent had the power to regulate the business of insurance, see 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 u.s. 533 
(1944) (holding the antitrust laws applicable to the business of 
insurance), Congress responded by passing the MeCarran-Perguson Act, 
59 Stat. 34, 15 u.s.c. SlOll et seq. As initially proposed, the Act 
bad a narrow focus. It would have provided only: •That nothing 
contained in the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the 
Sber.an Act, or the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as 
the Clayton Act, shall be construed to apply to the business of 
insurance or to acts in the conduct of that business or in any wise 
i~ir tbe regulation of that business by the several States.• s. 
Rep. ao. 1112, 78tb Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1944) (quoting proposed act). 
~is narrow version, however, was not accepted. 
COngress subsequently proposed and adopted a much broader 
bill. It recognized, as it had previously, the need to accomodate 
federal aatitraet laws and state regulation of insurance. See B. 
-... -.. 143, 79tb eong., 1st Seas., 3 (1945). But it also 
c..,..t_. tllat tile decisloa ln foutb=lastern Underwrltere 
, • ...,._ W c-... ._...tloea • to tile ,....ral vall4ltr of state 
t-. ...... atlti"llldll 
desires to protect the continued regulation .. . of the 
business of i.nsurance by the several States." Ibid. 
2. 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act, as adopted , accordingly commits 
the regulation of the insurance industry presumptively to the 
States . The introduction to the Act provides that "silence on the 
part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to 
the regulation or taxation of [the) business (of insurance] by the 
several States." 15 u.s.c . SlOll . Section 2(b) of the Act further 
provides : " No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate , 
impair , or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of 
regulating the business of insurance • •• u nless such Act 
specifically relates to the business of insurance ." 29 u.s .c. 
Sl012(b) . 
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Revised version of footnote 7 (page 6): 
Most state laws regulating insurance and annuities 
explicitly proscribe "unfair discrimination between persons in the 
same c.lass." Bailey, Hutchinson & Narber, The Regulatory Challenge 
to Life Insurance Classification, 25 Drake L. Rev. 779, 783 (1976). 
Arizona insurance law similarly provides that there shall be "no 
unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class." Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. §20-448 (1983). Most of these States, including 
Arizona, have determined that the use of actuarially sound sex-based 
mortality tables comports with this state definition of 
discrimination. Given the provision of the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
that Congress intends to supersede state insurance regulation only 
when it enacts laws that "specifically relate to the business of 
insurance," see n. 6, supra, the Court offers no satisfactory reason 
for concluding that Congress intended Title VII to pre-empt this 
important area of state regulation. 
The Court states that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is not 
relevant because the petitioners did not raise the issue in their 
brief. See ante, at ___ , n. 17. This misses the point. The 
question presented :is whether Congress intended Title VII to prevent 
employers from offering their employees--pursuant to state law--
actuarially sound, sex-based annuitites. The McCarran-Ferguson Act 
is explicitly relevant to determining congressional intent. It 
provides that courts should not presume that Congress intended to 
supersede state regulation of insurance unless the act in question 
2 . 
Mspecifically rclntcs to t h h · 
· e us1ness o f in s u rnnce ." See n. 6, 
supra . It therefore is necessary to conside r t he appli cabi lity of 
the McCarran-Ferguson Ac t i n dete r·mi n ing Congress ' i ntent in Ti tle 
VII . This presents t wo questions : whethe r t he act i on a t i ssue unde r 
Title VII involves the "business of i ns u rance" and whethe r the 
application of Ti tle VI I would " i nva l i da t e , i mpa ir, o r super sede" 
state law . 
No one doubts t hat the dete rmina tion of how ri s k should be 
sp r ead among c lasses of ins ur eds is an in tegral pa rt o f the 
"busi ness of i ns urance." See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal 
Drug Co., 440 O.S. 205, 213 (1979); SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 
u. s. 65, 73 (1959). The Court argues, nevertheless, that the 
.McCarran-Ferguson Act is inapposite because Title VI I wi 11 not 
supersede any state regulation. Be cause Title VII applies to 
employers rather than insurance carriers, the Court reasons that its 
v iew of Title VII will not affect the business of insurance. See 
ante, at __ , n. 17. This formalistic distinction ignores self-
evident facts. State insurance laws, such as Arizona's, allow 
employers to purchase sex-based annuities for their employees. 
Title VII, as the Court interprets it, would prohibit employers from 
purchasing such annuities for their employees. It begs reality to 
say that a federal law that thus denies the right to do what state 
insurance law allows does not "invalidate, impair, or supersede" 
state law. Cf. SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 u.s., at 67. The 
Court's interpretation of Title VII--to the extent it banned the 
sale of actuarially sound sex-based annuities--effectively would 
pre-empt state regulatory authority. In my view, the commands of 
McCarran-Ferguson Act are directly relevant to determining tne 
congress' intent in enacting Title VII. 
3. 
